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MOTIVES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
THE FSC DISPUTE: RECENT SALVO IN
A LONG STANDING TRADE WAR OR
FASHIONING A BARGAINING CHIP?
"The money is the key to this thing."
"Show me the money."2
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 20, 2001 the World Trade Organization ("WTO")
formally ruled against the United States for its system of
granting special tax breaks to U.S. exporters in violation of in-
ternational law. The WTO decision stemmed from the Euro-
pean Union's ("EU") legal challenge of these tax breaks as ex-
port subsidies, which are prohibited under the 'General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").' Ironically, the U.S. fash-
ioned the latest disputed tax provision, the Extraterritorial In-
come Exclusion Act ("ETIA), 5 in order to comply with a WTO
decision from two years earlier that declared the Foreign Sales
Corporation ("FSC") provision of the tax code illegal under
GATT as a prohibited export subsidy.6
Answering the call by both U.S. exporters and politicians, the
United States Trade Representative ("USTR") announced on
1. CARL BERNsTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN 34
(1974).
2. JERRY MAGUIRE (TriStar Pictures 1996).
3. EU May Hit U.S. with $4 Billion in Penalties - Commission Calls Tax
Credits Illegal, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2001, at El [hereinafter WASH. POST].
4. See United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations,"
Report of the Panel, WT/DS108/R (Oct. 8, 1999), at http'//www.wto.org
[hereinafter WTO Panel Report]; Text of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 5, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
5. Foreign Sales Corporation Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclu-
sion Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-519, 114 Stat. 2423 (2000) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the I.R.C.).
6. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 4. For the Act creating the FSC,
see Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 985-1103
(1984) (codified as I.R.C. §§ 921 - 927 (1994)).
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October 10, 2001, that the U.S. would appeal this latest WTO
ruling because it was clear, from the U.S. perspective, that "the
decision was in error."7 No doubt the decision to appeal was
collaterally calculated to demonstrate a degree of normalcy in
U.S. trade affairs in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terror-
ist attack in New York and Washington, D.C.8 Realistically,
however, the decision by the Bush Administration to appeal
was due in no small part to the immense political pressure
mounted directly by a triumvirate of proxy actors - the export
industrials acting severally, the export industrials acting col-
lectively through their trade coalitions and the export industri-
als acting proximately through their members of Congress.9 As
further evidence of the "seriousness" with which the Bush Ad-
ministration took this case, the opening arguments for the U.S.
appeal were made by Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Ken-
neth W. Dam."°
On January 14, 2002, the WTO Appellate Body issued its fi-
nal ruling against the U.S., holding that the ETIA is an illegal
subsidy, thus clearing the way for imposition of sanctions by
the EU."1 The import of the final WTO decision cuts across sev-
eral fronts. First, if the U.S. does not comply with the WTO
ruling and repeal the ETIA, the EU may be authorized to issue
some $4 billion in punitive trade sanctions on U.S. goods bound
for Europe. 2 These potential sanctions are greater than all
7. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S.
to Appeal WTO Ruling on FSC/ETIA Tax Law (Oct. 10, 2001), available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/wto/01101001.htm [hereinafter USTR Press Release].
8. See Robert B. Zoellick, Editorial, Countering Terror with Trade, WASH.
POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at A35.
9. See U.S. Appeals WTO Ruling on Export Tax Breaks, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Oct. 10, 2001, 2001 WL 25034459 (USTR Robert Zoellick commented
that many senators and business leaders had urged the government to appeal
the latest WTO decision) [hereinafter AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE].
10. Press Release, Department of the Treasury, Deputy Treasury Secre-
tary to Argue FSC Appeal at WTO (Nov. 5, 2001), available at 2001 WL
1354269.
11. See United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations"
- Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, Report
of the Appellate Body, WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 29, 2002), at
http://www.wto.org [hereinafter WTO ETIA Appeal Decision]; Edward Alden
et al., International Economy - Ruling Opens New Chapter in US-EU Trade
Dispute, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 15, 2002, at 10.
12. See WASH. POST, supra note 3.
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previous WTO approved sanctions to date combined, and would
no doubt prove devastating, not only to the U.S. export market
but to the global trade system as well. 3 Second, the WTO deci-
sion, by reaching into the political sanctity of the U.S. tax code,
has stoked the fires of those politicians who decry the disin-
genuousness of the EU vis-A-vis the U.S. with regard to its re-
strictive trade practices. 4 Finally, the decision is the most re-
cent exchange in the protracted series of trade disputes be-
tween the U.S. and the EU.15 Indeed it could be argued that
both European and American corporations are engaged in a
proxy trade war through their respective governments - pow-
erful multinationals that compete openly in the global market-
place, but also practice a kind of guerilla warfare in the WTO.
Though both the EU and the U.S. have officially tried to down-
play the disagreements, preferring to focus on the "common
interests in working together to advance the trade agenda
worldwide," there are deep-seeded issues underlying these
trade disputes that require comprehensive resolution.
16
Historically, the U.S government has been responsive to its
corporate constituencies in order to furnish them with incen-
tives to expand into new markets as well as ensure a stable,
competitive environment in which to conduct commerce. 7 This
13. America's Taxing Trade Troubles, J. OF CoMM., Aug. 21, 2001, LEXIS,
All Sources, News, Newspaper Stories, Combined Papers.
14. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott promising to take legislative action
against the EU and others for failure to adhere to WTO rules stated: "I'm
getting really fed up with the way we're being treated by our trading part-
ners." Gary Yerkey, Dinner Plates and French Champagne, EUROPE (Apr.
2001), at http:/www.eurunion.org/magazine/0104/dinner.htm. See Robert
Goulder & Warren Rojas, U.S. Senate Finance Committee Approves FSC Re-
peal Bill, 21 TAx NOTES INT'L 1384 (2000) (According to Senator Max Baucus,
"It's the EU bureaucrats in Brussels, who were upset about losing WTO dis-
putes [the hormone-treated beef and banana import disputes with the United
States], that caused us to be here [repealing the FSC law] today.").
15. See Christine L. Agnew, Overpriced Bananas, Bad Meat, or Foreign
Sales Corporations: What Is the EU Really Complaining About?, 21 TAX
NOTES INT'L 139 (2000).
16. Interview: EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, EUROPE (Apr. 2001),
at http//www.eurunion.orgmagazine/0104/interview.htm [hereinafter Inter-
view - Lamy].
17. See generally Paul Krugman, Competiveness: A Dangerous Obsession,
in THE NEW SHAPE OF WORLD POLITICS 161 (Council on Foreign Relations ed.,
1997).
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has translated into the U.S. government being a tireless advo-
cate for and promoter of American goods and services in foreign
markets. 8 This also has meant providing appropriate and
measured incentives in the tax code in the pursuit of the Holy
Grail of tax policy - tax neutrality.'9 While marshalling to-
wards these achievements, the U.S., with the assistance of cor-
porate beneficiaries, devised major tenants of both U.S. trade
policy and U.S. international tax policy."0 Notwithstanding this
public-private partnership, these benefiting corporations are
the likely stumbling blocks towards any progressive tax reform
or conciliation with the EU over the ETI.A/FSC dispute.2'
The problem at the heart of the FSC dispute no doubt in-
volves trade. The main domestic legal impediment to its reso-
lution, however, is not to be found in trade policy, but in tax
law.2 The U.S. tax code is structurally different than that of
most other nations.2 At issue is the fact that, generally, under
the U.S. tax code, export income is taxed whereas under most
EU member state's tax schemes, it is not.24 Recognizing that
U.S. exporters were at a distinct disadvantage to the Europe-
ans tax-wise, the U.S. devised in law the Domestic Interna-
tional Sales Corporation ("DISC") in order to "equalize Ameri-
can exporters with foreign counterparts exporting from coun-
18. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Trade Service, at
http'//www.usatrade.gov (last visited April 15, 2002); United States Trade
Representative, at http://www.ustr.gov (last visited April 15, 2002).
19. See RICHARD L. DOERNBERG, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN A NUTSHELL 3
(4th ed. 1999).
20. See, e.g., Jacob Heilbrunn, The Sanctions Sellout, NEW REPUBLIC, May
25, 1998, at 26; Glenn Kessler & John Lancaster, Lobbyists Shaping Stimu-
lus Bill; Special Interests Scramble for Tax Breaks, Other Windfalls, WASH.
POST, Nov. 11, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 29761716; Karen V. Kole,
The Status of United States International Taxation: Another Fine Mess We've
Gotten Ourselves Into, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 49, 51 (1988).
21. See Alden, supra note 11.
22. Cf Gary C. Hufbauer, Income vs. Consumption Taxation: Domestic
and International Reforms, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1555, 1562 n.20 (2001) ("The
origins of the FSC case had nothing to do with tax policy and everything to do
with the European search for 'bargaining chips' to trade against EU losses in
the Bananas and Beef Hormone cases, and the prospective expiration of the
agricultural 'peace clause' in 2003.").
23. See DOERNBERG, supra note 19, at 6-11, 19.
24. See generally PAUL MCDANIEL & HUGH J. AULT, INTRODUCTION TO
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 155 (4th ed. 1998).
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tries providing indirect tax refunds and exemptions."' Unfor-
tunately for the U.S., the DISC was challenged by the EU as
illegal under international law, thus compelling its change.26
The same result occurred with the tax program that succeeded
the DISC, the FSC, and again with its successor, the ETIA.27
These challenges raise the question of how to maintain the cur-
rent tax code while providing tax incentives for exporters that
are WTO compliant.
One option, but with serious revenue consequences for the
federal government, is to simply forego all income tax derived
from U.S. exports.2 This solution; however, runs afoul of the
basic principle of the U.S. tax code, which is the right to tax
income wherever it is earned.29  Another option is to simply
abandon the FSC/ETIA regime altogether." But this is
unlikely since the formulation of tax policy and the drafting of
tax law is too complicated to do in one session of Congress, let
alone at the command of the WTO. Moreover, the government
is under enormous pressure by lobbyists seeking to preserve
this export benefit. 31 The U.S. is thus constrained by the struc-
ture of its tax system, on the one hand, and by its obligations
under international law to reform the tax code, on the other.
Thus the question stands, what should the U.S. do?
25. Ronald D. Sernau, Note, The Foreign Sales Corporation Legislation: A
$10 Billion Boondoggle, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1185, 1190 (1986).
26. See Tax Legislation, Dec. 7-8, 1981, GATT B.I.S.D. (28th Supp.) at 114
(1982).
27. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 4; United States - Tax Treatment
for "Foreign Sales Corporations" - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
the European Communities, WT/DS108/RW20 (Aug. 20, 2001), at
http'//www.wto.org [hereinafter WTO Panel Report - ETIA].
28. See, e.g., Ernest R. Larkins, WTO Appellate Body Rules Against FSCs:
The Search for Alternatives Begins, 11 J. INT'L TAxN 14, 14-16 (2000) [herein-
after Search for Alternatives] (noting that such a plan, which is in effect a
conversion of the U.S. tax code from a "worldwide" system to a "territorial"
system [discussed at length, infra Part II.B.], would raise many serious is-
sues for policy makers to contend with).
29. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; McDANIEL & AULT, supra note 24.
30. See Search for Alternatives, supra note 28, at 14-16.
31. See, e.g., U.S. Loses Dispute over Trade Taxes, DESERET NEWS (Salt
Lake City), Feb. 24, 2000, at E3 ("Business lobbyists said that if the corpora-
tions lost the tax breaks entirely, they would find themselves at a serious
disadvantage against European competitors.") [hereinafter DESERET NEWS];
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, supra note 9.
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As this Note will suggest, the answer lies in dissecting the
underlying motivations of both the EU and the U.S. in their
trade policies in general and in the FSC case specifically.
Analysis will reveal that, to an extent, the FSC battle is being
waged for the benefit of a few large multinational corporations
3 2
in what may be characterized as an elaborate form of corporate
welfare. In addition, the EU has recently been motivated to
pursue the FSC case in order to counter-balance its own losses
33before the WTO for restrictive trade practices. U.S. policy, on
the other hand, has been arranged into a two-tiered strategy as
influenced by its corporate citizenry. The first is to ensure tax
relief for U.S. exporters in order to foster foreign trade.34 The
second is to pursue a strategy of delay, in order to stave off the
inevitable loss of their tax benefit or until an alternate WTO-
compliant regime can be devised.35
Finally, since only a few U.S. multinationals directly benefit
from the FSC program,36 this Note will challenge the assertion
that without FSCs, the U.S. export economy will wither. More-
over, criticism about loss of sovereignty, European disingenu-
ity, and alarmist talk about trade wars are mere smokescreen
attempts to pander to special interest groups and distract from
dealing with the hard issuesY.3  There are presently significant
32. Jose Oyola, Foreign Sales Corporations Beneficiaries: A Profile, 21 TAX
NOTES INT'L 389, 389 (2000).
33. See Hufbauer, supra note 22, at 1562.
34. See DESERETNEWS, supra note 31.
35. Andrew Osborne, WTO Backs Europe in Row over Tax Breaks: Brus-
sels Tells US it Must Scrap Scheme or Face £2.7 bn. Sanctions, GUARDIAN
(London), Aug. 21, 2001, at 21.
36. Oyola, supra note 32, at 389.
37. For an academic perspective on these issues, see, e.g., Gregory Shaffer,
Symbolic Politics and Normative Spins: The Link Between U.S. Domestic
Politics and Trade - Environment Protests, Negotiations, and Disputes, 31
ENVT'L. L. REP. 11, 174 (2001) ("[Due to] the 2000 election of a Republican
administration .. . the WTO will continue to be a target for attacks and a
political symbol of the negative aspects of globalization... the consequences
for the WTO could be stagnation, hesitancy, and calls for curtailing the scope
of its authority, from conservative think tanks."); Clyde Summers, The Battle
in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 61, 71 (2001) ("[T]o illustrate [the WTO's] reach into a country's
sovereignty, the WTO, acting on a complaint by the European Union, ordered
the United States to amend its tax code to close a loophole exploited by U.S.
transnational enterprises."); John H. Jackson, The Uruguay Round Results
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discounts and deferral programs in the tax code that exporters
could employ to remain competitive in foreign trade.38 It is the
exacting reality of international economics, which keeps these
companies engaged in foreign trade, not a tax credit. The
proxy trade battles engaged by the U.S. and the EU seem to
boil down to the classic struggle of free trade - protectionism
vs. market access. The Bush Administration, Congress and the
business community will need to consider these factors against
the relative benefits of being a member of the WTO when craft-
ing a policy and legal solution to the FSC dispute.
As background, Part II of this Note will discuss the major as-
pects of the U.S. and EU tax codes - how they contend with
international taxation and their attendant structural frictions,
which lay at the heart of the FSC dispute. Part II will also
briefly focus on the procedural background of the FSC dispute39
and trace the history of the tax credit from the DISC to the
ETIA. Part Ill will analyze the suspected policy motivations of
the EU's longtime attack on the FSC as well as U.S. resistance
to effectuating fundamental change. Finally in Part IV, this
Note will suggest that the time has come to bid the FSC fare-
well. It will be also be urged that diplomatic negotiations be-
tween the U.S. and EU begin in earnest to comprehensively
address tax issues in a trade context in hopes of stemming fu-
ture systemic frictions that yield no true positive benefits.
and National Sovereignty, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND 293 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Mathias Hirsch eds., 1998); Scott McBride, Note, Dispute Set-
tlement in the WTO: Backbone of the Global Trading System or Delegation of
Awesome Power?, 32 LAW & POLY INT'L Bus. 643 (2001); Paul B. Stephan,
American Hegemony and International Law: Sheriff or Prisoner? The United
States and the World Trade Organization, 1 U. CHI. J. INT'L L. 49, 74 (2000)
(arguing that despite the fact that the U.S. dominates the post-Cold War
international environment, it is nevertheless subject to the strong persuasion
of the WTO in how it conducts its affairs in "at least one narrow but impor-
tant area of international relations - commercial relations across boarders").
38. See, e.g., Search for Alternatives, supra note 28 (suggesting that U.S.
multinationals with excess foreign tax credits may be better off without a
FSC and small and mid-sized exporters have available the DISC - which
charges interest for tax deferrals, thus making them WTO compliant).
39. Technically, the DISC, the FSC, and the ETIA are different statutory
tax relief programs with similar objectives, if not effects. For the sake of
simplicity, this Note will refer to the EU challenge as the "FSC dispute" gen-
erally, unless a more specific reference is necessary.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Structural Differences Between U.S. and EU Tax Schemes
1. National Systems of Taxing Income
There are basically two forms of income tax systems em-
ployed by nations: (1) a "worldwide" system; and (2) a territo-
rial system.4 ° The U.S. utilizes a worldwide system - i.e., all
income of U.S. residents (including a corporation organized in
the U.S.) is taxable regardless of the source of that income,
whether earned through domestic or foreign endeavors.41 By
contrast, the Member States of the EU employ a territorial sys-
tem - i.e., only income earned within the borders of the na-
tion's taxing jurisdiction is subject to tax.42 Foreign income,
under the territorial system, is either not taxed or is taxed at a
significantly lower rate than domestic earnings.43 The choice to
adopt either tax system is entirely a national political decision
and neither system is advocated nor preferred under interna-
tional law. Indeed, the WTO Report of the Appellate Body
called attention to this premise when it declared that its deci-
sion against the U.S. FSC was:
[N]ot a ruling that a Member must choose one kind of tax sys-
tem over another so as to be consistent with that Member's
WTO obligations. In particular this is not a ruling on the
relative merits of "worldwide" and "territorial" systems of
taxation. A Member of the WTO may choose any kind of tax
system it wishes - so long as, in so choosing, that Member
applies that system in a way that is consistent with its WTO
obligations.44
The relative merits of each system are the subject of tax policy,
government revenue necessities and other legal and political
40. See JACOB A. FRENKEL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN AN
INTEGRATED WORLD 22-24 (1991); MCDANIEL & AULT, supra note 24, at 33.
41. See H.R. REP. No. 106-845, at 13 (2000), reprinted in 2000
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2206, 2210-11; U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
42. H.R. REP. No. 106-845, supra note 41.
43. Id.
44. See Report of the Appellate Body on United States: Tax Treatment for
Foreign Sales Corporations, WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000), at 60, at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e.htm [hereinafter WTO Report of
the Appellate Body].
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considerations that each nation must uniquely address for it-
self.4
5
2. Principles of International Taxation and the Problem of
Double Taxation
Foreign trade gives rise to opportunities to engage in com-
mercial activities that exploit comparative advantages in capi-
tal and labor, thus earning its owners vast profits. The gov-
ernments of those trading partners reserve the right to tax any
of this foreign income based on, for example, the nationality of
the trading entity (as under the worldwide system) or based on
the location of the transaction (as under the territory princi-
ple).46 In practice, nations typically adopt features of both tax
systems (e.g., employing one system for personal income and
another system for corporate income).
When there are overlapping claims of taxing authority, coor-
dination difficulties between countries may exist.48 Known as
"juridical double taxation," most nations attempt to alleviate it
through domestic legislation as well as through bilateral tax
treaties. 49 The issue of tax overlap is acute when dealing with
exports since, by their nature, they involve cross-border trans-
actions in at least two separate taxing jurisdictions." This
typical problem is especially complicated where both nations
exercising tax jurisdiction employ regimes based on the differ-
ent income tax theories described above.5' Comparatively, each
system has fundamentally different methods for avoiding the
double taxation problem.52
Any instance of double taxation, resulting from a domestic
combination of the different tax systems or due to juridical
45. See generally Peggy B. Musgrave, Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Coop-
eration in International Taxation, 26 BRoOK. J. INVL L. 1335, 1336-42 (2001).
46. DOERNBERG, supra note 19, at 2.
47. FRENKEL, supra note 40, at 22.
48. See DOERNBERG, supra note 19, at 2.
49. Id.
50. See United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations"
- Recourse to Article 21.05 of the DSU by the European Communities,
WT/DS108/RW, at 10, (Nov. 1, 2001), at http'//www.ustr.gov/enforcement/
2001-11-Olappellantsub.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Appellant Brief- ETIA].
51. See DOERNBERG, supra note 19, at 2.
52. See H.R. REP. No. 106-845, supra note 41.
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double taxation, is commonly ameliorated through either a tax
credit or a tax exemption.53 These approaches are utilized ei-
ther unilaterally, by a nation through its domestic laws, or bi-
laterally, among nations through tax treaties. 4 Oversimplified
for illustrative purposes, in a country that utilizes a worldwide
system, a tax credit is granted to corporations or individuals
that have paid taxes to a foreign government on income earned
overseas." Generally this tax credit is deducted from what is
owed domestically by the taxpayer." In a territorial system
country, a tax exemption is the preferred method of avoiding
double taxation.57 That is, income earned overseas under this
system is usually not subject to taxation at all. 8 The EU has
observed that "countries that apply a territorial system, of
course, do not need special provisions for the avoidance of dou-
ble taxation, since in the exercise of their residence jurisdic-
tion, they do not tax foreign source income." 9 Intuitively, if all
countries adhered to the same tax system, there would be no
double taxation problem."
3. International Taxation - The Worldwide System in the U.S.
Adopting the worldwide tax theory, the U.S. reserves the
right to tax all residents on income wherever it is earned.'
Since most exporters are corporations, for simplicity, this Note
will analyze the varying tax theories as they relate to business
enterprises. Thus, when an American firm with a wholly-
owned foreign subsidiary (known generically in the tax world
as a controlled foreign corporation or "CFC") repatriates its
profits back to the U.S. parent corporation, after paying tax to
the foreign nation also exercising jurisdiction over the subsidi-
ary, under U.S. tax law, these profits will be taxed again.62 The
income earned overseas is commonly repatriated when it is dis-
53. See id.
54. See U.S. Appellant Brief- ETIA, supra note 50, at 10.
55. See H.R. REP. No. 106-845, supra note 41.
56. Id., at 14.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. U.S. Appellant Brief- ETIA, supra note 50, at 13.
60. See FRENKEL, supra note 40.
61. Id.
62. See MCDANIEL & AULT, supra note 24, at 109.
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tributed as a dividend to the U.S. shareholders.63 To minimize
deferral of corporate income taxes by operating through off-
shore tax havens that impose little or no income tax, the U.S.
Congress enacted "Subpart F" of the Internal Revenue Code
("I.R.C.")." At the same time, however, in order not to stifle
U.S. firms with an overbearing tax burden, the U.S. foregoes
the foreign tax paid and credits that amount, against the do-
mestic tax due to the treasury.65 This way, double taxation is
mitigated. This basic outline of the U.S. rebate system is beset
with complex rules and procedures that determine the source
(domestic or foreign) of income as well as other specific exemp-
tions and procedures. 6 These rules are, however, beyond the
scope of this Note.
4. Direct Taxation v. Indirect Taxation - Income Tax v. VAT
A direct tax system is one that imposes a duty specifically on
earnings or profits.' The U.S. federal income tax regime is
model of a direct tax.6" An indirect tax system is one that im-
poses a duty on consumption of a good or service.69 Most EU
nations employ some form of an indirect tax, usually a value
added tax ("VAT"). 70 An example of an indirect tax in the U.S.
is the sales tax imposed by the several states on goods sold
63. Id.
64. See MCDANIEL & AULT, supra note 24, at 109-110; I.R.C. §§ 951-954
(2000).
65. See FRENKEL, supra note 40, at 23.
66. WTO Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 44. For example, un-
der these rules is the "foreign tax credit." I.R.C. § 901(a) (2000).-
67. See Hunter R. Clark et al., The WTO Ruling on Foreign Sales Corpora-
tions: Costliest Battle Yet in an Escalating Trade War Between the United
States and the European Union?, 10 MIN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 291, 306 (2001).
68. Id.
69. See Christopher Deal, Note, The GATT and VAT: Whether VAT Ex-
porters Enjoy a Tax Advantage Under the GATT, 17 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP.
L. REv. 649, 650-51 (1995).
70. Id. at 650. VAT:
[Is a "consumption tax" levied on sales of goods and services. VAT
is computed by assessing a rate percentage of the value added to a
good at each stage of production, normally at a flat rate. In contrast,
a corporate income tax is levied only on a corporation's net profits.
Id. at 651.
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there.7' The distinction between direct and indirect taxation is
important because, it helps to explain the underlying conflict
between the U.S. and EU in the FSC dispute as well as the
structural legal impediment to resolution.
American corporations are subject to both federal and state
income taxes as well as state sales tax, which is a product of
the division of powers between the federal government and the
state governments as provided by the U.S. Constitution.72 Cen-
tral governments generally create incentives to encourage a
particular activity that it deems important to the welfare of the
nation. A subsidy is a prime example of such an incentive.
One method of subsidizing an activity is for the government to
provide tax relief. Striking a balance between the incentive,
here tax relief, and government revenue requirements is, to be
sure, complicated. The U.S. federal government is particularly
sensitive to these concerns since, if it did not provide some tax
relief, U.S. exporters would be subject to a significant total tax
burden, possibly eroding competitiveness.7" However, due to
constitutional separation of powers reasons, the U.S. can only
provide relief of some of the direct tax burden imposed on its
taxpayers.74
The U.S. direct tax, coupled with the state tax burdens (both
direct and indirect), functionally penalize exports since income
arising from this activity is subject to tax without relief.75 Most
governments of the EU by comparison raise revenue by indirect
taxation, the most popular form of which is the VAT.76 EU ex-
porters do not pay tax on their foreign sales, which is a func-
tion of the their territorial principle of taxation. This is accom-
plished under a VAT system by way of a tax credit, which is
refunded to the exporter.77 The significance of this cannot be
understated. Under GATT rules, indirect taxes on exports may
be refunded, but direct taxes may not.78 Thus, this recognized
distinction under international law between indirect and direct
71. See Clark, supra note 67, at 310-11.
72. U.S. CONST. amends. X, XVI.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See McDANIEL & AULT, supra note 24, at 155.
76. Deal, supra note 69, at 650-51.
77. Id. at 664-65.
78. See id.; GATT, supra note 4, art. XVI:4.
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taxes furnishes a comparative advantage on EU exporters over
their U.S. counter-parts. Succinctly put by Professor Hunter R.
Clark, "[s]ince the EU does not tax foreign income of its corpo-
rations, many of which have established subsidiaries in tax
haven, and the European corporations are allowed a VAT
credit, EU exports are relieved from virtually all tax burdens,
whereas American firms are not."7 9 As a result, the European
exporter can sell its goods overseas at a reduced price. Exports
are thus encouraged (or arguably subsidized) because of the
structure of the EU tax system.
This comparative tax advantage does not present the entire
picture, however. Firms by and large do not decide whether to
engage in foreign trade solely based on tax liability. When a
corporation seeks to expand its reach into a foreign market
there are many avenues of approach. For purposes of this
Note, the most significant are: (1) foreign direct investment;
and (2) export and import of goods or services..8
As briefly demonstrated above, the tax treatment of an
American CFC (an example of a foreign direct investment)81 is
exceedingly complicated. Equally complicated, and underlying
the FSC issue, is the tax treatment of income derived from ex-
port operations. Generally, under U.S. tax rules there is no
special treatment for the income of U.S. citizens derived from
foreign sources.82 If a foreign government taxes that income,
the domestic taxpayer has available to it, inter alia, a foreign
tax credit, otherwise it is subject to U.S. tax.8 3 The U.S. has,
however, from time to time, adopted preferential tax treatment
in several instances to advance some vital policy goal." One
such goal was to stimulate U.S. foreign trade. From this con-
cern developed the line of tax programs that became known
collectively as the FSC.'
79. See Clark, supra note 67, at 312.
80. See generally RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL, INTERNATIONAL BusINEss
TRANSACTIONS 41-46 (4th ed. 1999).
81. Id. at 45.
82. See MCDANIEL & AULT, supra note 24, at 155.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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B. A Brief History of FSCs and the Nature of the Dispute6
1. Closing the Trade Deficit - The DISC
At the close of the 1960's, America's trade balance and posi-
tion on debt servicing was dismal. s7 Consequently, to remedy
the problem, in 1971 the Nixon Administration removed the
U.S. from the gold standard and simultaneously urged Con-
gress to enact a package of trade measures designed to improve
the balance-of-payments position.88
The Domestic International Sales Corporation ("DISC") pro-
gram was part of the legislative package. 89 The DISCs encour-
aged American firms to export their products by means of a tax
deferral on goods bound for foreign markets.9" Under provi-
sions of the DISC Act, an American firm would establish a shell
subsidiary corporation - one that had no assets and no em-
ployees - for the sole purpose of running foreign bound goods
through it in order to obtain lower taxes on eventual export
profits.9' In effect, the DISC would "buy" the goods from the
manufacturer and "sell" them to the foreign clients overseas.9
Of the profits made, one-half would remit back to the corporate
parent (as fully taxable), but the other half was tax deferred.93
According to Paul McDaniel and Hugh J. Ault, the "subsidy
took the form of a deferral of U.S. tax on a portion of export
income channeled through a DISC, [rendering it] in effect an
interest-free loan from the Treasury to U.S. exporters."94 This
tax deferral was the method by which Congress encouraged
86. This section is intended only to be a cursory review of the FSC dispute,
including its procedural history before the WTO and how FSCs operate. A
more in-depth explanation of these technical aspects is beyond the scope of
this Note.
87. See Robert E. Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures: The
Lessons of the DISC Case, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1445 (1988).
88. Id. at 1445-46.
89. Id.
90. See Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497, 535 (1971)
(codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 991-997 (1994)); H.R. REP. No. 106-845,
supra note 41, at 13.
91. See sources cited supra note 90.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. McDANIEL & AULT, supra note 24, at 155.
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exports. Though merely a deferral, exporting firms eventually
relied on the mechanism as a full tax exemption. 5
Practically from its inception, DISCs were the subject of
complaints from the EU and other nations.96 They objected
that DISCs violated the GATT, specifically Article XVI: 4,
claiming it was an "illegal export subsidy."97 In an attempt to
cease their use, the EU commenced a lawsuit in 1972, which
for all parties ended, by all accounts, unsatisfactorily several
years later.98 Taking the offensive, the U.S. counter-sued the
Netherlands, Belgium and France alleging that the DISC legis-
lation merely mirrored their tax structures.99 In 1976, a GATT
dispute panel ruled against the DISC program but also ruled
against the European governments that taxed their exports
more favorably than similar domestic transactions.'00 Under
GATT rules, in order for a dispute panel's findings to have the
force of law, it must be adopted unanimously by the litigating
parties.'0 ' The U.S. was willing to accept the panel's ruling on
the DISC, provided that the Dutch, Belgians and French also
accepted the panel's adverse findings over their own tax sys-
tems.0 2 The EU refused to accept, however, that their tax re-
gimes allowed for export subsidies.0 ' As a result of this im-
passe, these GATT tax reports were not adopted for several
years by its litigants.
95. See Hudec, supra note 87, at 1446.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 1443; see infra, note 100.
99. See Hudec, supra note 87, at 1445.
100. See Tax Legislation - United States Tax Legislation (DISC), Nov. 12,
1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23rd Supp.) at 98 (1977); Income Tax Practices Main-
tained by France, Nov. 12, 1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23rd Supp.) at 114, para. 47
(1977); Income Tax Practices Maintained by Belgium, Nov. 12, 1976, GATT
B.I.S.D. (23rd Supp.) at 127 (1977); Income Tax Practices Maintained by The
Netherlands, Nov. 12, 1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23rd Supp.) at 136 (1977); see
generally Hudec, supra note 87, at 1482-85. For a more in-depth discussion
on the DISC dispute specifically, see also John H. Jackson, The Jurispru-
dence of International Trade: The DISC Case in GATT, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747
(1978).
101. See GAIT, supra note 4.
102. See Hudec, supra note 87, at 1481.
103. H.R. REP. No. 106-845, supra note 41, at 14.
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2. The Foreign Sales Corporation
In 1981, the U.S. and the EU agreed to adopt the GATT tax
reports under a mechanism whereby the GATT Council
adopted the factual findings subject to an "understanding."' °4
The 1981 understanding, arguably incorporated the principles
established in a footnote of the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code
accepting that it was not an export subsidy when a country re-
frained from taxing foreign-source income (derived from foreign
economic processes), even if this resulted in exports being taxed
more favorably than domestic transactions. 5 Based on this
principle, the Congress created the FSC program as part of the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984."06 The purpose of the law was,
inter alia, to bring the U.S. into conformity with GATT's legal
obligations as well as "to reap the export-enhancing benefits of
the [approved] exemption method."'0 7 Thus, as the U.S. under-
stood the GATT rules, an exemption from tax on export income
was permissible only if the economic processes that gave rise to
the income took place outside the U.S. °8 Though mirroring
aspects of the territorial tax system, in that export transactions
are completely separated from domestic sales and are tax ex-
empt, the major difference was that the FSCs tax exemption
applied only to exports, while a territorial tax system exempts
from taxation, both exports and other foreign earned income." 9
Typically, FSCs were established by corporations as wholly
owned subsidiaries. 10 The parent corporation then supplied
those goods, using arm's length or special administrative pric-
104. See Tax Legislation, supra note 26 (the U.S. agreed to the Panel's
adoption of the DISC Report decision without conceding that the DISC vio-
lated the GATT); WTO Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 44.
105. See Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI,
and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades, Apr. 12, 1979,
1186 U.N.T.S. 204.
106. I.R.C. §§ 921 - 927 (1994).
107. H.R. REP. No. 106-845, supra note 41, at 14. See also Sernau, supra
note 25, at 1190; WTO FSC/ETIA DISPUTE, infra note 132.
108. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, 98TH CONGRESS, GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF
1984, at 1041-42 (Committee Print 1985) [hereinafter Joint Committee Re-
port].
109. Id.
110. BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 68-11, 68-11 (2d ed. 1997).
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ing rules, to the FSC for resale abroad."' There are more than
6,000 companies that depend on the FSC tax regime.' Most of
the FSCs were set up in U.S. territories (the U.S. Virgin Is-
lands and Guam) or in Barbados, where registration fees and
local taxes are very low."3
Unlike DISCs, FSCs are separately incorporated companies
located outside the U.S. for the purpose of conducting export
transactions (sales and distribution) of goods outside the U.S.""
In making these shell corporations GATT-compliant, Congress
split the foreign aspect of relevant export transactions - sales
and distribution - from the domestic aspect - manufacture."'
The result was that U.S. manufacturers ran all their export
sales through the FSC and received a generous tax benefit,
while their domestic sales would be handled locally and taxed
at their normal corporate rate."6 In addition, any domestic in-
come earned by the FSC was taxed fully but income from for-
eign sales was exempted and segregated."'
The essence of the FSC dispute is similar to the DISC case.
Recall that the FSCs were devised to employ facets of the terri-
torial tax system - the exemption method - in conformance
with the 1981 GATT understanding."' Notwithstanding this
accord, the EU argued that the FSCs violated the WTO Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM") and
the Agreement on Agriculture as an illegal export subsidy.'
Distinguishing the DISC case of the 1970's from the FSC case
of the 1990's is the presence of the WTO. As the successor to
111. Id. at 68-12. Arm's length pricing is governed by I.R.C. § 482 (2000).
It is a method of allocating income between different branches of the same
firm that is based on the prices that the separate branches would charge each
other if they were unrelated. It is meant to prevent the evasion of taxes and
reflect each branch's true tax liability. FSCs also employ special administra-
tive pricing which was meant to further enhance export trade. For a more
thorough analysis, see id. at 79-2.
112. See Agnew, supra note 15, at 140.
113. See BrrTKER & LOEKEN, supra note 110, at 68-12.
114. Id. at 68-17.
115. See WTO FSC/ETIA DIsPuTE, infra note 132.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See H.R. REP. No. 106-845, supra note 41.
119. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 4.
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the GATT dispute settlement process, the WTO was empow-
ered with greater authority as well as enforcement protocols.120
The EU contended that the U.S. tax code provided improper
export subsidies by permitting special tax treatments for in-
come earned by FSCs.12' These tax treatments were illegal be-
cause the U.S. was waiving tax receipts otherwise due for the
benefit of encouraging exports. 122 This forbearance of taxes vio-
lated Articles 3.1(a) and 3.1(b) of the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement")." Under
the SCM Agreement, a subsidy is deemed to exist, inter alia,
when "there is a financial contribution by a government or any
public body within the territory of a Member .... where: gov-
ernment revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not col-
lected (e.g., fiscal incentives such as tax credits); and a benefit
is thereby conferred."24
The WTO ruled against the U.S. when its dispute panel is-
sued its report in October 1999.125 The U.S. subsequently lost
on appeal in February 2000.126 Essentially, the WTO agreed
with the EU that the tax benefit conferred upon FSCs consti-
tuted foregone revenue otherwise due and therefore was a sub-
sidy. 12 ' Furthermore, because the subsidy was contingent upon
"export performance," it was prohibited under the SCM Agree-
ment and thus illegal. 128 Accordingly, the WTO requested that
the U.S. bring the FSC program into compliance with the SCM
120. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 22, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 2,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M.
1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
121. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 4.
122. Id.
123. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Annex 1A, at 229, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter SCM
Agreement].
124. SCM Agreement, supra note 123, arts. 1, 1.1(a)(1)(ii) & (b).
125. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 4.
126. See WTO Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 44.
127. Id.
128. Id. The WTO Dispute Panel also found (and was subsequently upheld
by the Appellate Body) that the FSC program violated Articles 3.3, 8 and 10.1
of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Id. For simplicity, this Note concen-
trates only on the SCM Agreement violations.
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Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture.19  Responding
to the WTO Appellate Panel's decision, then USTR Charlene
Barshefsky noted that although the U.S. will respect its WTO
obligations, it will ensure that "U.S. firms and workers are not
at a competitive disadvantage with their European counter-
parts. 130
3. The Extraterritorial Income Act and the Next Move
In the late summer of 2000, in order to bring the U.S. tax
code into WTO conformity, Congress began work on H.R. 4986
- the Foreign Sales Corporation Repeal and Extraterritorial
Income Exclusion Act of 2000, which was intended to be a si-
multaneous repeal and replacement of the FSC."'
At the same time the EU and the U.S. had agreed on a
framework that governed any further challenges that the EU
may have with corrective measures taken by the U.S. in wake
of the WTO findings.'32 The U.S. enacted the ETIA in Novem-
ber 2000, making it the first U.S. law ever changed in response
to an international trade ruling.133 Senator William Roth, Jr.,
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee remarked that the
ETIA "satisfies the United States' obligations with the [WTO]
and ensures that U.S. businesses will be able to compete on a
level playing field against foreign competitors in the global
marketplace.""
Contrary to the rhetoric of both the Clinton Administration
and the Congress, the ETIA did not bring the U.S. corporate
tax code into WTO compliance, but instead broadened both the
benefits and beneficiaries of the tax abatement.3 ' Indeed, the
129. Id. 178.
130. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, US
Disappointed with WTO FSC Ruling, Vows to Work With EU to Reach Solu-
tion (Feb. 24, 2000), available at http'//www.ustr.gov/press.
131. Foreign Sales Corporation Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclu-
sion Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-519, 114 Stat. 2423 (2000) (codified in scat-
tered sections of the I.R.C.).
132. See NAT'L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, WTO FSC/ETIA DISPUTE, avail-
able at http'//www.nftctax.org/FSC/ (last visited May 31, 2002).
133. Id.
134. Robert Goulder & Warren Rojas, U.S. Senate Finance Committee Ap-
proves FSC Repeal Bill, 21 TAx NOTES INT'L 1384, 1384 (2000).
135. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. H11,885 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2000) (statement
of Rep. Archer) [hereinafter Statement of Rep. Archer]; 146 CoNG. REC.
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EU's Trade Minister, Pascal Lamy, went so far as to call the
new ETIA law "even worse" then the original FSC program.13 6
To co-opt a phrase, congressional tax experts and their corpo-
rate suitors assisting through trade coalitions, in a fit of "irra-
tional exuberance," clearly deluded themselves into believing
that the ETIA would be the panacea to their WTO troubles."l 7
Though trumpeted as bringing the U.S. under WTO compliance
by dismantling the FSC program, the ETIA's "language and
concepts are largely borrowed" from the repealed FSC pro-
gram.18 An analysis of the ETIA and its legislative history re-
veals that Congress intended to provide export incentives to a
broader constituency.'39 In short, the ETIA creates a package of
tax benefits that are comparable to the FSC program, but al-
lows a "broader spectrum of taxpayers" to be eligible. 40 To in-
corporate the benefits of a territorial tax regime within the
U.S. worldwide system was the legislative slight-of-hand that
the Congress hoped to achieve. 4 ' Indeed, a press release by the
National Foreign Trade Council ("NFTC") noted that the
ETIA's scheme "would impose broader territorial limits on U.S.
tax authority so that extraterritorial income, or income earned
outside the United States would not be taxed." However,
S11,455 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 2000) (statement of Sen. Roth) [hereinafter State-
ment of Sen. Roth]. See also President's Statement on Signing the FSC Re-
peal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000, 36 WEEKLY CoMp.
PRES. Doc. 2885 (Nov. 20, 2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2234; but
see, e.g., Dissenting and Additional Views, H.R. REP. No. 106-845, supra note
41, at 63 (criticizing the preservation and expansion of export tax benefits to
both the software, tobacco, pharmaceutical and military technology indus-
tries).
136. EU/US: Americans Contest EU Demand for USD4 Billion Sanctions,
EuR. REP., Dec. 2, 2000, 2000 WL 24320190.
137. The phrase "irrational exuberance" is attributed to the current U.S.
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan.
138. Ernest R. Larkins, Extraterritorial Exclusion Replaces FSC Regime:
Mirror Rules, Broader Spectrum, 12 J. INT'L TAX'N 22, 22 (2001).
139. Id. at 22-23 (Unlike the FSC program, the ETIA permits foreign dis-
tributors and manufacturers to also share in the tax benefits, imposes no
geographical restriction on where eligible subsidiaries may be organized
(though it is expected that they will incorporate in tax havens imposing little
of no foreign tax, e.g., Guam), and allows aggressive pricing procedures be-
tween the parent corporation and the tax reducing subsidiary).
140. Id.
141. See H.R. REP. No. 106-845, supra note 41, at 14.
142. Press Release, National Foreign Trade Council, House Approves H.R.
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U.S. Treasury Department officials were careful to note that
the new law did not abandon the U.S worldwide tax system in
favor of a territorial system.43 The drafters of the ETIA sought
to use the WTO FSC findings as a template from which to care-
fully craft a compliant law while maximizing benefits for ex-
porters.'"
The EU was unhappy with the ETIA. Almost immediately
after its passage, the EU requested that the WTO constitute a
panel to review the legislation.'45 The EU declared that the
"new law not only maintains the violations found by the WTO
in the FSC case but may even aggravate them."46 Simultane-
ously, the EU filed a procedural request with the WTO for au-
thorization to impose some $4 billion in sanctions against the
U.S. to retaliate for harm done to European companies by the
U.S. tax breaks.'47 The effect of these procedural movements by
the EU merely extended the timeline for a final WTO determi-
nation, in essence a stay of execution, until the summer of
2001.148 Though the U.S. remained confident that the ETIA
would withstand WTO scrutiny, the WTO dispute panel an-
nounced its findings in June 2001 confirming suspicions that
the enactment of the ETIA did not bring the U.S. into WTO
compliance and that the law constituted a prohibited export
4986 (Nov. 14, 2000), available at http'/www.nftctax.org/FSCBillPassesCon-
gress.html.
143. See Robert Goulder, U.S. Treasury Official Denies FSC Repeal Signals
Move to Territoriality, 21 TAx NOTES INT'L 2749, 2749 (2000).
144. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Deputy Secretary of
Treasury Stuart E. Eizenstat, Remarks at House Ways and Means Commit-
tee FSC Mark Up (July 27, 2000), available at http'//www.ustreas.gov/
presslreleases/ps812.htm.
145. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UPDATE
(2001), at http'//www.ustr.gov/dsu/.
146. Officials - EU-U.S. May Have Time to Work Out More Than FSC Flap,
MARKET NEWS INT'L, Nov. 20, 2000, 2000 WL 33291047.
147. See Elizabeth Olson, EU Says No Deal in U.S. Tax Spat Dispute, Will
Rest with WTO, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 22, 2000, at 14; Geoff Winestock,
Europe Could Impose Sanctions After WTO Report Condemns Subsidies,
WALL ST. J. EUR., Aug. 21, 2001, 2001 WL-WSJE 21835711; WASH. POST,
supra note 3.
148. See Olson, supra note 147.
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subsidy.' The WTO dispute panel formally adopted these
findings on August 21, 2001."0
Ending weeks of speculation over the possibility of a negoti-
ated settlement, on October 10, 2001, the U.S. announced, to a
disappointed EU, its intention to appeal the WTO dispute
panel decision on the ETIA."' Arguably, the appeal was less on
substance and more on form - many trade experts believe that
an appeal by the U.S. is a tactic to buy more time in which to
resolve this dispute "peacefully," i.e., without resorting to sanc-
tions.'52 The concern over sanctions is very real. Earlier this
year USTR Robert Zoellick declared that looming European
trade sanctions this large would be equivalent to "using a nu-
clear weapon on the trading system."'53 Ideally, the EU would
prefer that the U.S. dismantle the ETIA."' However, seeing
the U.S. tax provision dismantled will be no easy task for sev-
eral reasons. First, Congress hesitatingly replaced the FSC
with the ETIA only two years ago in response to the WTO deci-
sions and any attempt to fix this provision legislatively will
take many months, if at all.'55 Second, the Bush Administra-
tion and the Republican-controlled Congress are not readily
amenable to "multilateral constraints on American freedom of
action."'56 Moreover, this dispute has developed a systemic in-
ertia all its own that may be difficult to stop.'57 Tellingly, al-
149. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 106-845, supra note 41, at 14.
150. WTO Panel Report - ETIA, supra note 27.
151. See Joseph Kahn, U.S. Will Appeal Tax Ruling After Talks with
Europe Fail, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2001, at A15; USTR Press Release, supra
note 7.
152. See Osborne, supra note 35..
153. See America's Taxing Trade Troubles, supra note 13.
154. See Osborne, supra note 35.
155. See Thomas Says Remedy for Foreign Sales Corporations Could Take
over Six Months, CONGRESS DAILY, Feb. 7, 2002, 2002 WL
8307321[hereinafter CONGRESS DAILY].
156. Pascal Lamy, ECONOMIST, July 7, 2001, at 52, 52 [hereinafter
ECONOMIST].
157. See Larry Elliot & Charlotte Denny, Strangelove Tendency Revived,
GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 17, 2002, at P26, available at 2002 WL 9514836
(The FSC dispute "is a hangover from the different relationship between Sir
Leon Brittan, the former EU trade.commissioner, and.., the pedantic lawyer
Charlene Barshefsky [the former USTRI .... People haven't been able to stop
it in the past, and it is worrying that it might go to another stage without
people being able to stop it now.").
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though the EU spoke of its desire to avoid a confrontation, on
the very day that the WTO announced its formal findings in
the FSC case, the EU threatened to push the trade sanctions'
"nuclear button" anyway."'
While U.S. resolve has been demonstrated by the symbolic
assignment of senior Treasury and Commerce Department offi-
cials to present the opening remarks of this latest appeal, it
does appear, according to recent press releases, that the U.S.
anticipated defeat.159 Indicating that the "U.S. was ready to
abide by whatever decision the appeals body reached," Under-
Secretary of Commerce Grant Aldonas criticized previous WTO
decisions as providing little guidance on what the U.S. needs to
do to bring its tax code into WTO compliance. 6 ' Despite fore-
shadowing a loss by the U.S., it interestingly signaled a will-
ingness by the U.S. to remedy the problem given clear guidance
from the WTO.
On January 14, 2002, the WTO appellate body rejected the
U.S. appeal on the merits.'6' After an almost six-year odyssey
the EU's quest to attack the FSC has almost come to an end, at
least legally. While certainly a win for the EU as a legal mat-
ter, because of the size of the penalty, this victory as a trade
matter may be Pyrrhic. What makes this trade dispute any-
thing but ordinary is the sheer size of the penalty - $4 billion
in economic sanctions. Sanctions of this size, if imposed, will
hurt the EU as well as the U.S. Perhaps buying time, the U.S.
immediately petitioned the WTO over the inaccurate size of the
EU sanctions award, petitioning for a lower, albeit still devas-
tating penalty of almost $1 billion dollars.6 ' Surrender or ne-
gotiation are all that remain for the U.S.
It is curious that in the midst of an economic slowdown and
recovery, the world's two largest trade blocs are edging towards
158. EcoNoMisT, supra note 156.
159. See Michael Mann, International Economy - U.S. Calls for Clear
Rules on Taxation, FiN. TIMES (London), Nov. 20, 2001, at 14.
160. Id.
161. See WTO ETIA Appeal Decision, supra note 11; Elliot & Denny, supra
note 157; Paul Blustein, U.S. Loses Ruling in Trade Fight with Europe; WTO
Decision Allows EU to Seek Penalties, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2002, at El;
CONGRESS DAILY, supra note 155.
162. See Heather Scott, USTR Appeals to WTO to Cut EU FSC Sanctions to
$956Mfrom $4B, MARK= NEWS INT'L, Feb. 14, 2002, 2002 WL 14350950.
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multi-billion dollar trade sanctions.'63 How is it that the U.S.
and the EU, which represent the world's most wealthy and de-
mocratic-liberal regimes, could not, up to this point, settle this
dispute through diplomacy and compromise?"M In the immedi-
ate aftermath of the terrorist attack against the U.S. on Sep-
tember 11, 2001, an embroiled trade war with Europe seemed
to be remote.'65 Indeed in a time of international charity, as the
U.S. and its allies were engaged in the war on terrorism, a ne-
gotiated settlement appeared all the more likely. However, the
EU's charity is sorely being tested with the announced decision
by the Bush Administration to impose tariffs on steel imports
from the EU and elsewhere.
66
That both the U.S. and the EU find themselves on the brink
of, what some commentators have called, a trade war, demon-
strates that there is something more fundamentally at stake
here then quibbling over the definition of what is an export
subsidy. 67 It might be useful to unveil the motivations behind
these tax and trade policies in order to distill the politics from
both trade and tax policy and the legal impediments toward a
workable compromise.
III. POLICY MOTIVATIONS OF THE EU AND THE U.S.
In analyzing any international conflict, an exploration of the
aggrieved party's motives may be revealing. However, it is
wise to caution that inevitably there is not one overriding mo-
tive that compels states to act but, rather, several strands of
intertwined policy considerations derived from both domestic
and international, political and economic forces. 68 Making mo-
163. WASH. POST, supra note 3.
164. See Kahn, supra note 151.
165. See Vago Muradian, Export Control, Trade Issues Slide to Back Burner
in Wake of Attacks, DEFENSE DAILY INT'L, Sept. 21, 2001, 2001 WL 7476068.
166. See Geoff Winestock, How One Trade Dispute Fuels Another - U.S.
Steel Tariffs May Stiffen EU Opposition to Tax Breaks, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12,
2002, at A18 ("Both EU and U.S. officials say that the steel dispute has wors-
ened the atmosphere" in the weeks leading up to the WTO decision of a final
sanctions award on April 29, 2002.).
167. See Daniel T. Griswold, Trade Feuding: The Coming Trans-Atlantic
Trade Tussle, ASiAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2000, 2000 WL-WSJA 23754032;
William M. Funk, The Thirty-Years Tax War, 22 TAX NOTES INT'L 65 (2001)
(describing the entire three decades FSC dispute as a tax war).
168. Though beyond the scope of this Note, for background on general
international relations theory, see INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY (P.
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tive analysis even more complicated, the FSC dispute is a fric-
tion between an independent state actor (the U.S.) and an in-
ternational regional confederation (the EU). Though it may be
more readily apparent to discover a single state actor's policy
motives, it will surely be difficult to derive, with the same de-
gree of confidence, policy motives of a confederacy, as it is the
product of several complicated parts. That said, trade disputes
are nominally about each state actor (or trade union's) at-
tempts at domestic industrial and agricultural hegemony,
while simultaneously striving to break through and access the
markets of one's foreign competitor, who in turn is seeking its
own form of hegemony. The pursuit for greater market access
through the tearing down of protectionist tariffs and non-tariff
barriers has long marked the trade struggle between the U.S.
and EU.69 This idea has provided powerful rhetoric for each
side in its quest. It oversimplifies and ignores the driving in-
fluences, however, faced by both Brussels and Washington -
their respective constituencies. 7 ° For the U.S., its corporate
citizenry wields tremendous influence with regard to both tax
and trade policy and thus colors how its government will ap-
proach the EU over the FSC dispute. Likewise, the EU is also
influenced by its citizen corporations but is also swayed by the
participation of its governmental bureaucracy at the nation-
state level and within the EU organization itself."' Compara-
tively, government participation in European business affairs
is more closely aligned than one finds in the U.S. where laissez-
faire still predominates.
ternational relations theory, see INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY (P. Viotti
& M. Kauppi eds., 1987); ROBERT KEOHANE & JOSEPH NYE, POWER AND
INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION (2d ed. 1989); A. Slaughter
et al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Genera-
tion of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998).
169. See generally KENNETH W. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GLOBAL GAME - A
NEW LOOK AT U.S. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING 95 (2001); Chris-
topher Stevens, EU Policy for the Banana Market: The External Impact of
Internal Policies, in POLICY-MAKING IN THE EU 326 (Helen Wallace & William
Wallace eds., 1996).
170. See J.D. Greenwald, U.S. Law and Practice, in SUBSIDIES AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE - A EUROPEAN LAWYERS' PERSPECTIVE 33 (Jacques H.
J. Bourgeois ed., 1991).
171. See generally STEPHEN GEORGE, POLITICS AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 88-91 (3d ed. 1996).
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A. Corporate Influence in U.S. Tax & Trade Policy
One facet that is generally overlooked in an international
trade dispute is the extent to which corporate interests drive
(perhaps manipulate) a trade grievance under the WTO dis-
pute settlement understanding ("DSU"). Ultimately, the WTO
complaint that starts out as a grievance by a company, soon
emerges as the cause c~lgbre of an industry and then takes on a
life of its own through the WTO as the USTR gets attached to
and nurtures the case, much like an attorney, seeking the best
deal for its "corporate client." Under this type of arrangement
the system is bound to become strained. This pattern is also
played out within the EU. Its net result is the exposure of the
flaw with the DSU. Not inherently, but in the way it is being
used - there is increasingly less incentive to negotiate and
more incentive to litigate.172
WTO trade disputes may be brought only by its members
(i.e., nation-states) and not the aggrieved multinational corpo-
ration or any other entity.7 1 In effect, the national govern-
ments of WTO members can be characterized as agents of their
respective corporate body politic at WTO tribunals. No doubt,
national governments are significantly influenced by the paro-
chial agenda of its corporate citizenry no less than by the de-
sires of its people.' This helps to explain why both the U.S.
and the EU have been reactive in their position strategies in
trade disputes, generally, and in the FSC dispute, particu-
larly.
175
To briefly address what is at stake, it is helpful to review a
few pertinent statistics. For the calendar year 1999, the U.S.
172. See generally Robert A. Green, Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving
Disputes Between Governments: A Comparison of the International Tax and
Trade Regimes, 23 YALE J. INT'L LAW 79 (1998); Pascal Lamy, Address to the
Economic Strategy Institute, Washington, D.C. (June 7, 2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/speeches-articles/spla59_en.htm [hereinafter
Lamy - Address].
173. See generally WTO Agreement, supra note 120; DSU, supra note 120.
174. For a cynical, if not truthful view of corporate influence in the legisla-
tive process in the U.S., see DAN CLAWSON ET AL., DOLLARS AND VOTES: How
BUSINESS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS SUBVERT DEMOCRACY (1998); NORMAN J.
ORNSTEIN & SHIRLEY ELDER, INTEREST GROUPS, LOBBYING AND POLICYMAKING
(1978); DAM, supra note 169, at 11.
175. See Griswold, supra note 167.
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exported $696 billion worth of goods and services.'76 Of this,
companies accounted for $585 billion or 84% of the total export
value. 7  Large companies, defined as having more than 500
employees, account for only 4% of all exporters but export 71%
of the total export value. 78 These figures are significant in
demonstrating the enormous economic power that large com-
panies wield. One demonstration of this power is the ability
and willingness of companies, at least in the U.S., to influence
government policymakers through their governmental lobbying
efforts and campaign donations.'79 For example, in the 2000
election year cycle, the computer software industry made over
$12 million in campaign contributions to those running for a
federal office. 8" The defense industries contributed almost
$13.6 million 8 and the communications industry contributed
some $131 million. 182 Assuming that dollars correlate with in-
fluence in the political process, these facts are illustrative of
the tremendous influence that corporations can levy through
campaign donations." For their contributions, the corporate
actors are granted "access" to officials that provides them with
"a chance to shape the details of legislation, crafting loopholes
that undercut the stated purpose of the law."" The classic
176. See U.S. CENsus BuREAu, EcoNoMIcs AND STATISTIcS ADMINISTRATION:
A PROFILE OF U.S. EXPORTING COMPANIES, 1998-1999 (2001), available at
http'//www.census.gov/foreigntrade/aip/h-edbrel-9899.pdf (Aug. 21, 2001).
177. Id. The remaining portion of the total export value was accounted for
by individuals, governments, low-value estimates, and documentation filed
with missing or incomplete company identifiers. Because not all export ship-
ments can be linked to specific companies, the number of exporters may be
understated. Id.
178. Id.
179. See CLAWSON, supra note 174, at 13.
'180. See The Center for Responsive Politics, Long Term Contribution
Trends - Computer/Software Industry, at http'J/www.opensecrets.org/
industries/indus.asp?Ind=C5120 (last visited May 31, 2002).
181. The Center for Responsive Politics, Long Term Contribution Trends -
Defense Industry, at http'/www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?Ind=D
(last visited May 31, 2002).
182. The Center for Responsive Politics, Long Term Contribution Trends -
Communications/Electronics Industry, at http'//www.opensecrets.org/
industries/Indus.aspInd=B (last visited May 31, 2002)
183. See CLAWSON, supra note 174, at 13.
184. Id.
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loophole that is sought is the coveted corporate tax break.'" So
many tax breaks are lobbied for each year that according to one
commentator, "[t]he Tax Code has become the de facto U.S. in-
dustrial policy."186 For example, "In 1955, corporations paid
27.5% of all federal taxes, but in 1995 they paid only 11.6%.187
For purposes of this Note, these facts demonstrate that: (1)
elected officials are influenced by corporations because they
contribute heavily to their campaigns; and (2) because corpora-
tions are a powerful force within the economy. Thus when
companies that are heavily dependent on foreign trade, such as
those in communications, defense and software industries, re-
quire government assistance, they generally receive it - when
the FSC was threatened, the government responded.
According to a recent study of corporate financial statements,
250 companies utilizing the FSC have reported approximately
$1.2 billion in FSC tax benefits received.188 Eighty-seven per-
cent of these benefits are received by the fifty largest compa-
nies (over 500 employees) that are heavily engaged in export
trade.'89 The WTO has found that the FSC benefits amount to
$2.5 billion per year.9 ' Perhaps not coincidentally, a large
share of these firms are in the defense, communications and
software industries.19'
Corporations are certainly not shy when it comes to asking
the U.S. government for help. The nature of that help, of
course, comes in different forms depending upon the immediacy
of the circumstances.9 Generally, the level of vigor with which
185. See Glenn Kessler & John Lancaster, Lobbyists Shaping Stimulus
Bill; Special Interests Scramble for Tax Breaks, Other Windfalls, WASH. POST,
Nov. 11, 2001, at Al.
186. See CLAWSON, supra note 174, at 71.
187. Id. at 223.
188. See Oyola, supra note 32, at 389.
189. Id.
190. Press Release, European Union, WTO Panel Condemns U.S. Export
Subsidies (Sept. 20, 1999), available at http://www.eurunion.org/news/
press/1999/1999058.htm.
191. See Oyola, supra note 32, 389-91.
192. One needs only to look at the recent aftermath of the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks for an example, where the U.S. airline industry asked
for and received a multi-million dollar bailout. Other more mundane in-
stances occur through routine lobbying efforts. See, e.g., Airline Industry
Financial Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001).
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corporations employ when engaged in petitioning their gov-
ernment varies with both the legislative cycle and the com-
pany's business goals.19 The corporate pressure on both the
administration and Congress with regard to the FSC issue has
been targeted and effective. Domestic business and trade or-
ganizations such as the Business Roundtable, the European
American Business Council, and National Foreign Trade Coun-
cil as well as policy think tanks, such as the CATO Institute
and the American Enterprise Institute, have organized discus-
sion fora and Internet sites that are focused on the FSC dispute
in order to focus concern over the issue in a measured way that
benefits the firms."M The NFTC for example, organized a joint
letter to President George W. Bush, signed by sixty-eight chief
executive officers of the largest U.S. corporations, urging the
administration to make the FSC dispute a trade priority and
encourage a negotiated settlement, presumably to avoid losing
their tax break.195
An important rift in the political support for the FSC comes
from those members of Congress and public policy groups op-
posed to the tremendous returns that the exporters receive in
tax breaks as an example of corporate welfare. Senator John
McCain denounced the ETIA as an expansion of an "unneces-
sary subsidy" that includes "full benefits to defense contractors
... and agricultural cooperatives" where "few of these benefits.
. trickle down to the American worker."'96 There were several
speeches made on the floor of the House of Representatives, as
well as dissenting views included in the congressional commit-
tee report on the ETIA, which railed against the legislation for
the enormous subsidy benefits it provided as corporate welfare
to weapons exporters, the pharmaceutical industry and the to-
193. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Congressional Broadband Fight Intensifies,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 2002, at C4; CLAWSON, supra note 174.
194. See, e.g., NFTC, at http'//www.nftc.org (homepage discussing the FSC
Dispute and its efforts to assist in legislative solutions); Symposium, Will the
FSC Dispute Ignite a Transatlantic Trade War? (Oct. 4, 2000) (forum tran-
script and audio/visual recording), at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/
speeches/cf-100400.html (last visited April 15, 2002).
195. See NFTC, supra note 194; Paul Magnusson, This Tax Break Could
Trigger a Trade War, BusINEss WEEK, Sept. 4, 2000, at 103.
196. 146 CONG. REC. S11,454 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 2000) (statement of Sen.
McCain).
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bacco industry.19 Despite these modest attempts to defeat the
bill and as testament to the power of industry lobbying, the
ETIA did of course pass both chambers of Congress and become
law.
American industry has had some form of export subsidy for
over thirty years. Firms first received the DISC to encourage
exports.'98 Once utilized and relied on, it became a necessity of
exporting, and companies were loath to surrender the subsidy
in spite of the GATT decision against it. 9 9 According to one
commentator, "the business lobby's challenge [was to] . . .pre-
serve the lucrative tax break while at least appearing to ad-
dress the substance of Europe's complaint."'00 As part of the
1984 tax relief legislation, exporters demanded and received
the GATT compliant FSC.' °' Corporate exporting interests,
again, lobbied to preserve the subsidy and assisted in the pas-
sage of the ETIA, only this time with greater benefits.'0 ' Per-
haps recognizing that these export benefits will have a brief
shelf-life under the WTO, a degree of over-compensation was
built into the law.'0 ' In the final analysis, now that the U.S.
has lost the ETIA appeal - and with it, all legal recourse -
serious political decisions (as well as corporate resistance) over
both tax and trade policy will have to be confronted and over-
come. 21 Whenever these discussions do commence, industry
will undoubtedly be a party to them. 5
197. See 146 CONG. REC. H11,891 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2000) (statement of
Rep. Stark); 146 CONG. REC. H11,893 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2000) (statement of
Rep. Doggett); H.R. REP. No. 106-845, supra note 41, at 63-70 (Dissenting
and Additional Views of Reps. Stark, Doggett and Lewis).
198. See supra Part II.B.1. discussion on the DISC; see also Hudec, supra
note 87.
199. See supra Part II.B.2. discussion on the FSC; see also Sernau, supra
note 25.
200. Magnusson, supra note 195, at 103.
201. See supra Part II.B.2. discussion on the FSC; Sernau, supra note 25.
202. See Magnusson, supra note 195, at 103; supra Part II.B.3. discussion
on the ETIA; Clark, supra note 67.
203. See Magnusson, supra note 195, at 103.
204. See Stephen Norton, TAXES: Thomas, Rangel Urge Administration to
Lead on FSC, CONGRESS DAILY, Feb. 27, 2002, at 17; Guy de Jonquieres, Rais-
ing the Transatlantic Trade Stakes, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 14, 2002, 2002
WL 3313225; Funk, supra note 165.
205. See, e.g., Stephen Clapp, Food Industry Fears Impact of WTO Tax
Decision, FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, Jan. 21, 2002, at 13, available at 2002 WL
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B. Fashioning a Bargaining Chip - Motivations of the EU
After the initial creation of the FSC in 1984, the EU did not
challenge the U.S. for some fourteen years."6 Why? The most
palpable theory is that the EU attacked the FSC because it was
tactically looking for a quid pro quo exchange of sanctions pen-
alties."7 Earlier the EU was badly bruised by two major trade
defeats before the WTO, over its discriminatory banana import-
ing practices ("Banana's case")208 and for its ban on hormone
treated beef ("Beef-hormone). 0 9 As was permitted by the
WTO, the U.S. imposed respectively $191 million and $116 mil-
lion in punitive duties on European products imported into the
states.210 However, this has been somewhat muted in the Ba-
nana's case as the EU and the U.S. eventually brokered a deal
and avoided the punitive sanctions under the so-called "carou-
sel" retaliation plan.21
Comparatively, the penalties faced by the EU in the Bananas
and Beef-hormone cases are miniscule to that faced by the U.S.
in the FSC case. At least one commentator has described the
FSC matter as the "costliest battle yet in an escalating trade
11878560. The industries that have been targeted for EU sanctions seem to
be more concerned over the prospects of being hit by $4 billion in punitive
sanctions than they are at losing their ETIA tax benefit. Proof of this is in
the recent U.S. appeal to the WTO to cut the sanctions figure to a level that is
"linked to the purported impact of the FSC on the EU's actual trade inter-
ests." Scott, supra note 162.
206. See Magnusson, supra note 195, at 103.
207. See Agnew, supra note 15; Hufbauer, supra note 22.
208. WTO Panel Report on European Communities: Regime for Importa-
tion, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, adopted Sept. 25, 1997
(WT/DS27/R/USA), at httpl/www.wto.org/english/tratop-je/dispue.htm.
209. WTO Panel Report on European Communities: Measures Affecting
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), adopted May 20, 1996
(WT/DS27IR/USA), at http'/www.wto.org/english/tratop-edispu-e.htm.
210. EU Aims for Huge Sanctions on the U.S., WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2000,
atA2.
211. See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative,
U.S. Trade Representative Announces the Lifting of Sanctions on European
Products as EU Opens Market to U.S. Banana Distributors (July 1, 2001),
available at http/usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/wto/pp0701.htm (The "carou-
sel" sanctions plan, as part of the African and Carribean Trade Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat. 251 (2000) (codified in scattered sections of 19
U.S.C. (2000)) provided for a rotating list of punitive sanctions on European
goods, worth collectively $300 million, in order to make the retaliation more
painful).
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"212
war between the United States and the European Union.
With so much at stake, it would seem reasonable to believe
that good faith negotiations between the U.S. and the EU are
underway. The Fourth WTO Ministerial Meeting in Doha,
Qatar in November 2001, seemed to present an opportunity to
jump-start such talks, but with the U.S. appeal already in play
at the time, any chance for a negotiated settlement, at least
publicly, had to be put off. Notwithstanding the myriad of
other trade issues between the U.S. and the EU, thus far no
explicit plans have been announced regarding formal negotia-
tions, except for ad hoc ministerial meetings.213
When dealing with the U.S. in trade matters, Europe has
several long-standing concerns, among them is the dominance
of the U.S. in both the European and global markets and the
corollary, the market share by European firms in both markets.
Driven by competitiveness and fueled by domestic pressures to
stem U.S. cultural hegemony, the EU was pressed into action
by its large Member States, such as France, for example. 214 At
the height of the Internet/dot-com boom, the U.S. extended
FSC benefits to the American software industry, which the EU
estimated would save the industry some $600 million in taxes
over a five year period.1 With concerns over the U.S. preemi-
nence in intellectual property industries being as great as they
are, particularly in Europe, this announcement was almost too
much for the EU to bear.216 This tax subsidy to the U.S. soft-
ware industry, a product of "adroit lobbying," was enthusiasti-
cally promoted.217 Indeed today, Microsoft, Inc. is widely con-
sidered to be one of the FSC's greatest beneficiaries.1 8 With
this new addition to a subsidy that the EU estimated at $2.5
212. Clark, supra note 67, at 306.
213. See Alden, supra note 11, at 10.
214. See Interview - Lamy, supra note 16; Alden, supra note 11.
215. Press Release, European Union, EU and U.S. Held WTO Consulta-
tions of FSC Export Subsidies (Dec. 17, 1997), available at
http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/1997-4/pr85-97.htm.
216. See id.
217. Jonathan I. Feil & Mary Ann Ekman, Foreign Sales Corporations: Tax
Savings Opportunities for Software Exporters, COMPUTER LAW., Sept. 1998, at
11, 11.
218. Les Blumenthal, WTO Ruling Targets U.S. Tax Breaks for Exporters;
Trade: Boeing, Microsoft Among Companies that WTO Says are Receiving
Billions in Illegal Subsidies, NEws TRIB. (Tacoma), Aug. 26, 2001, at D1.
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billion a year,"' coupled with its losses before the WTO, the EU
was prepared to use "tax policy as a sword."20 Congress
seemed convinced of this motivation and stated so in its report
on the FSC repeal/ETIA legislation, calling it "deeply troubling
and provocative.""' Moreover, the congressional report further
noted that the impetus behind the EU's challenge germinated
not from its corporate citizenry but from the EU itself in a
search for a sanctions bargaining chip with the U.S.' The EU
governance is certainly not immune from corporate or popular
influence. To be sure, European trade officials are keenly
aware of the cries of their countrymen when it comes to trade
matters.' Furthermore, while the EU is pointing its finger at
the U.S., its own hand is surely not unclean - many European
firms receive government subsidies ("grants") that are worth
around $200 billion.m Additionally, the U.S. has claimed that
several tax schemes of EU Members grant nearly the same "il-
legal subsidy" benefit as the FSC program, causing some EU
Members to be concerned that the U.S. may soon challenge
their tax schemes before the WTO.'
Exacerbating the already sensitive trade imbroglio with the
EU, the Bush Administration announced on March 5, 2002 that
219. Press Release, European Union, WTO Panel Condemns U.S. Export
Subsidies (Sept. 20, 1999), available at http://www.eurunion.org/news/
press/1999/1999058.htm.
220. See Agnew, supra note 15; Alden, supra note 11.
221. See H.R. REP. No. 106-845, supra note 41, at 14.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., ECONOMIST, supra note 156.
224. Keith Marsden, On Trade, the EU Is Economical with La Verite; A Top
EU Trade Negotiator Makes His Case Without Acknowledging its Flaws,
WALL ST. J. EUR., Nov. 30, 2000, 2000 WL-WSJE 27827580. The EU trade
official responded to the accusation of hypocrisy in the discussion of govern-
ment subsidies by insisting that the EU subsidies conform to EU treaties and
WTO rules, "countries must play by the rules." Finally the unnamed official
concluded that "countries can always complain to the WTO if they are not
satisfied." Id.
225. See Cecelia B. Skeen, Note, Knick-Knack Paddy Whack Leave the FSC
Alone: An Analysis of the WTO Panel Ruling that the U.S. Foreign Sales Cor-
poration Program Is an Illegal Export Subsidy Under GATM, 35 NEw ENG. L.
REv. 69, 113 (2000); Geoff Winestock & Neil King, Jr., WTO Rules Against
Law Giving Big Tax Breaks to U.S. Exporters, WALL ST. J. EUR., Jan. 15,
2002, 2002 WL-WSJE 3382894; U.S. Appellant Brief - ETIA, supra note 50,
at 17.
2002] 1097
BROOK. J. INTL L.
it was imposing temporary tariffs of up to 30% on steel imports
from Europe and elsewhere in order to protect the domestic
steel industry from depressed prices.2 6 Though currying favor
with the domestic steel industry, the decision by President
Bush did nothing but rile the EU. Ironically, such a move has
made future trade negotiations that much more difficult but all
the more necessary.
Tactically, if the EU winds up using its tax policy defen-
sively, then the U.S. should consider earnestly pursuing nego-
tiations towards a sanctions settlement. If, however, the EU is
behaving offensively, the U.S. should consider a WTO chal-
lenge of its own regarding the EU's tax subsidies.227 In any
case, the U.S. must proceed cautiously. Any offensive action
that ends in an "awarding" of sanctions, should be understood
as "fine[s] ... that both parties pay but nobody collects."28
The FSC dispute is one of many trade conundrums between
the U.S. and EU. Annually, each government publishes a re-
port that comprises a summary of the foreign trade barriers
that it encounters with the other (as well as with other na-
tions). The EU's Report on United States Barriers to Trade and
Investment, for example, lists among its contentions with the
U.S., the Helms-Burton Act, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act,
"Buy America" provisions, restrictions on the satellite commu-
nications market and of course the FSC dispute, to name but a
few.29 The U.S. insists that each dispute is to be treated as a
separate challenge. 3 ° Yet this may be an exercise in futility as
226. See Proclamation No. 7529, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,553 (Mar. 5, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020305-7.html;
Geoff Winestock, EU Wields a New Weapon in Trans-Atlantic Steel Fight,
WALL ST. J. EUR., Jan. 11, 2002, 2002 WL-WSJE 3352413; Neil King, Jr. &
Geoff Winestock, Bush's Proposed 30% Tariffs May Spark Trade Battle or
Derail Other Efforts, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2002, at A3; Winestock, supra note
166.
227. Agnew, supra note 15, at 141.
228. Griswold, supra note 167.
229. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, REPORT ON UNITED STATES BARRIERS TO TRADE
AND INVESTMENT 2001 (2001), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/
trade/bilateral/usa/pr.usrbti.htm; UNITED STATES TRADE REP., THE 2001
NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS (2001),
available at http:I/www.ustr.gov/html]2001_contents.html.
230. See Alden, supra note 11. Commenting on the two disputes:
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many of these trade disputes are not only interrelated but have
both systemic and underlying causes that must be addressed if
there is to be any lasting resolution and compromise. Case-in-
point, quoting an EU official, the Wall Street Journal reported
that while the FSC dispute and the U.S. steel tariffs are "not
directly linked, 'the steel case will influence the political cli-
mate.,- '
IV. CONCLUSION
A. Economics of the FSC
With all the international legal trouble that is attached to
FSCs, why does the U.S. insist on holding on to it so fervently?
Primarily, as suggested by this Note, it is because the export-
ing corporations, which mostly utilize this program, have saved
so much money from using FSCs. Through their well-packaged
lobbying efforts, they are convincingly able to seduce the politi-
cal decision-makers that this is a matter of sovereignty and
equity. These corporate beneficiaries tout the U.S. Treasury
department statistics that the FSC program increased U.S.
exports by $150 billion alone in 1992. 2 However, a report by
the Congressional Research Service of the Congress finds that
though the FSC attracts investment to exporting activities, the
program probably distorts the market and artificially boosts
exporting beyond what the natural market forces would have
accomplished otherwise.Y More significantly, adjusting for
currency exchange rates, the FSC's effect of increasing exports
also has the effect of increasing imports and thus does not di-
minish the negative trade balance the U.S. has with the EU.'
Some trade specialists have speculated that the steel and tax issues
may become entwined, with the United States backing off on protec-
tive steel tariffs in exchange for Europe relenting in its pursuit of the
tax dispute. But that would risk arousing fury among U.S. steel
companies, steelworkers, and their allies, and a U.S. official declared
flatly, "These are separate issues."
Blustein, supra note 161.
231. See Winestock, supra note 166.
232. See Larkins, supra note 28, at 14-16.
233. DAvID L. BRUMBAUGH, LIBRARY OF CONG., CONG. RESEARCH SERV.
REPORT, EXPORT -TAX BENEFITS AND THE WTO: FSCs AND THE ETIA
REPLACEMENT PROVISIONS 5 (2001).
234. Id. at 5.
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This is a surprising economic result considering that the FSC
and its antecedent programs were created specifically to nar-
row the trade deficit and balance of payments. The impact on
forgone revenues to the U.S. Treasury was estimated by the
Joint Committee on Taxation at $2.7 billion for the fiscal year
2000. This statistic tells the real story since the foregone tax
revenue is in effect a subsidy to these corporate exporters - an
enormous sum, albeit comparatively modest to the subsidies
received by EU firms.2 6 Though complicated and beyond the
scope of this Note, the economic analysis is telling in that it
exposes the fallacies propagated by the corporate lobbyists
about the supposed benefits of the FSC.
The evidence is clear: the FSC program is nothing more than
a camouflaged subsidy. The WTO decisions that declared the
FSC and ETIA to be an illegal subsidy under GATT merely
confirm this obvious fact. The options for the U.S. are sober-
ing. It will either have to: (1) accept the WTO decision and
dismantle this export subsidy in its present form (which will
displease the corporate benefactors); (2) ignore the decision and
accept the EU sanctions (equally displeasing to both consumers
and corporations); or (3) restructure its tax code (a challenging
but possibly long overdue endeavor).
The FSC (and its successor the ETIA) is nothing more than
the classic product of pork barrel politics. It is not an essential
core of U.S. tax law and policy. Notwithstanding all of the ar-
guments supplied by the lobbyists, the FSC can and should be
abandonedY.2 " The U.S. should respect its international legal
obligation by either drafting a new legislative device replacing
the FSC (ETIA) that meets WTO scrutiny or a through a total
reform of the U.S. tax code. The latter option should be con-
templated with a goal of permitting U.S. firms to achieve
235. Id. at 6.
236. See Marsdan, supra note 224.
237. See Evelyn Iritani, U.S. Must Rewright Tax Law, WTO Says, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2001, at C1 ("Rep. William M. Thomas, chair of the House
Ways and Means Committee, which writes tax policy, said the WTO ruling is
evidence that America's tax system is 'antiquated,' and needs a major over-
haul to lessen the burden on U.S. multinationals without violating interna-
tional trade rules.").
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greater competitiveness in global trade while neither sacrific-
ing tax neutrality nor progressive equity."8
In the final analysis, the U.S. will probably attempt to have
it all. Washington has signaled that it wants to retain the ex-
port benefit but make it WTO compliant.239 This reaching out
by the U.S. will probably be ignored by the WTO since it will
not want to appear to furnish policy guidance that may appear
to impinge on national sovereignty. In other respects, the tim-
ing for a major overhaul of the U.S. tax code may be inoppor-
tune while the nation is engaged in its pursuit to quash inter-
national terrorism.O Moreover, some members of Congress are
concerned that there may be hidden political objectives lying in
wait over any tax code reform.241 But that aside, when is there
ever an opportune time to engage in such a complex endeavor?
Congress should embrace this challenge and begin to formulate
a tax code for the 21st century. This leads to the only practical
short term tactic for resolution - negotiation.
B. Negotiate
No comprehensive effort to engage in a summit over the fun-
damentals underlying the various EU/U.S. trade imbroglios
has occurred to date. 2 These substantive issues have taken a
backseat to the procedural gamesmanship of the trade negotia-
tors, bent on achieving victory at any cost in order to win a
sanctions award.243 EU Trade Minister Pascal Lamy recently
urged the U.S. and the EU to search hard for collaborative and
comprehensive solutions to bilateral trade problems.2 Mr.
238. See id.
239. See Mann, supra note 159.
240. See CoNGRESS DAILY, supra note 155.
241. See Norton, supra note 204 (Rep. Charles Rangel, ranking Democrat
member of the House Ways and Means Committee, "expressed concern that
Republican interests in changing ... the tax code will simply be a launching
point for taking on more fundamental tax reform and a push for options that
he warned could lead to inequities in tax policy.").
242. See Lamy - Address, supra note 172.
243. Id. (Alluding to this situation, EU Trade Minister Pascal Lamy ac-
knowledged that "bilateral EU/U.S. trade needs to be fixed, and particularly
the trade negotiators, locked in mortal combat, shrieking with joy at each
new negotiating strategy that undercuts the other players, forcing one to 'pay
twice,' another to be demandeur.").
244. See id.
20021 1101
BROOK. J. INTL L.
Lamy recognized that the WTO settlement mechanism is not "a
faceless enforcer" to be used to litigate case after case in order
to "secure a fair outcome for our companies" lest the U.S. and
EU destroy their "credibility as negotiators."2"5 Mr. Lamy's ad-
vice hopefully points to a way out of the FSC impasse for the
U.S. and the EU The announced "Millennium Round" of trade
talks commenced at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Doha po-
tentially holds such promise. 6 The political leaders in Con-
gress as well as the loose coalition of corporate associations
clearly would prefer negotiation to sanctions." In fact, the
U.S. procedural tactics of appealing at each step of this dispute
in the WTO was practically engineered to permit the parties
opportunity to negotiate.248 Unfortunately local politics on both
sides has continually plagued this effort.
While many commentators and officials trumpet this dispute
as one of the most significant trade conflicts to date, especially
in light of the potentially devastating punitive sanctions, its
rhetorical value is greater than any de facto harm that may
result.249 Although the issue is being driven by the self-
interested concerns of both European and American multina-
tional corporations, seeking to increase their respective profits,
exports and market shares, they do have a legitimate griev-
ance. This grievance, however, stems not from traditional
claims of unfair competitive practices or traditional protection-
ism (tariffs), but from a fundamental difference between the
American and European tax systems and compliance with
WTO treaties and obligations.25 ° The U.S. has argued that na-
tions for decades have been free to choose their own taxation
system free from foreign challenge."l The EU responds that
245. Id.
246. For more details on the objectives and goals of these new rounds of
trade talks, see WTO, at http://www.wto.org (last visited May 31, 2002).
247. See Larkins, supra note 28, at 14-16; CONGRESS DAILY, supra note 155.
248. See Business & Finance: U.S. Asked to Revamp Tax Regime, IRISH
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2001, at 15.
249. See, e.g., supra note 5 (statement of Rep. Archer, calling the potential
showdown with the EU over FSCs the "mother of all trade wars").
250. See Renato Ruggiero, Wither the Trade System Next?, in THE URUGUAY
ROUND AND BEYOND 123, 133 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Mathias Hirsch eds.,
1998).
251. Magnusson, supra note 195, at 103.
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the U.S. has challenged it on the traditionally domestic areas of
food safety and environmental regulation. 2
There are many structural differences among the WTO
members with regard to their domestic labor, environmental
policies, agriculture, anti-trust, cultural policies and economic
systems. These parochial differences are the next great barrier
that must be contemplated if the goal of greater trade coopera-
tion is to be realized. In the thought-provoking essay, Wither
the Trade System Next?, former WTO Director-General Renato
Ruggiero, advanced the idea that in the highly-integrated
world of the early 21st century, "deeper integration [among
states] is... giving rise to... frictions based not on pressures
for economic competition or protection but on clashes between
distinct national systems.., investment rules, anti-trust and
competition laws, taxation, and labour, environmental and cul-
tural policies." s It is from these systemic "frictions" that gov-
ernments are being challenged, on the one hand, to harmonize
the differences internationally and to preserve a sense of sover-
eignty and control over its national destiny, on the other. 4
Nowhere has this systemic "friction" been more keenly felt than
in the FSC dispute.
The U.S. has generally taken the view that multilateral
trade agreements should not impact national tax systems."
Moreover, the U.S. considers that bilateral tax treaties are the
appropriate vehicles in which to coordinate tax policy. 6 The
EU, to the contrary, has been more enthusiastic in bringing
harmony between both trade and tax rules. 7 The U.S. should
accept this more comprehensive approach toward coordination
between trade and tax rules. Professor Paul McDaniel argues
in Trade and Taxation that "subsidies provided through a tax
system . . . should be subject to scrutiny under trade agree-
ments, just as are direct subsidies affecting trade or competi-
tion" but "provisions of a country's tax system that comprise
the normative.., structure of a tax should be outside the scope
252. Id.
253. Ruggiero, supra note 250, at 133.
254. See id. at 134.
255. See Paul R. McDaniel, Trade and Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1621,
1621 (2001).
256. Id.
257. Id.
20021 1103
BROOK. J. INTL L.
of trade agreements and procedures."258 If the U.S. was to
adopt this posture, it may provide the theoretical undercar-
riage necessary to enable policymakers to craft coordinated
trade and tax policy that meets with WTO scrutiny.
One final consideration, as suggested by William M. Funk, a
tax attorney, in his article The Thirty-Years Tax War, is that
during negotiations, the U.S. and EU must be realistic.2 19 The
parties should first recognize that in this world there exists
both the territorial and worldwide tax systems, and then fash-
ion rules for sheltering extraterritorial incomeY.2 " By accurately
reflecting the "international economic balance of power" any
compromise forged in such an acknowledgement will have a
sturdier foundation upon which to move forward.261  Thus,
apart from politics and moneyed interests, the EU and the U.S.
should lead by example and take up the challenge in the
FSC/ETIA dispute in order to bring harmony to the global trad-
ing system and establish a permanent economic peace.6 2
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